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Abstract 
 
We have proposed elsewhere an alternative analytical framework for project evaluation 
and a criterion of ‘human autonomy effectiveness’ to examine the effects of aid projects 
on the lives, opportunities and capacities of participants (Muñiz Castillo & Gasper, 
2009). A project is human-autonomy effective when it promotes an expansion of indi-
vidual autonomy that allows people to support and sustain their own development, in a 
way that does not constrain other priority capabilities. 
In this paper, we explore how four aid projects influenced the autonomy of local par-
ticipants, by examining their project logic. We elicit key assumptions behind the pro-
jects’ design and implementation; identify significant project practices (forms of inter-
action and practical strategies); and analyse the practices’ possible influence on the par-
ticipants’ autonomy. 
The paper shows that we need to understand the project logic in a deeper way than 
through the conventional ‘logical framework’ approach. Power relations between pro-
ject stakeholders are crucial elements of the actual practices that influence the access to 
resources as result of the projects. Moreover, practices such as top-down design or ex-
cessive conditionality could harm participants’ autonomy despite being supportive to 
other goals, and thus have negative longer-run significance. When project practices con-
strain the opportunities and perceived competence of individuals to help themselves, the 
‘development’ or change promoted by those projects is not sustainable (Ellerman, 
2006).* 
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Exploring human autonomy effectiveness: 
Project logic and its effects on individual autonomy 
The poor, unless their condition is deliberate (like a monk), already have a history of inef-
fectual action to better their condition, so any kind of assistance that reinforces that per-
ceived inability to help themselves is simply the wrong kind of assistance, no matter how 
well-intended (Ellerman, 2006, p. 127). 
1 Introduction 
Concerns on aid effectiveness have grown as there are now consensual priority goals to 
promote well-being (i.e., the millennium development goals) and more flows are allo-
cated to poor countries year on year. At the project level, effectiveness has been usually 
assessed in terms of the achievement of operational outputs (operational effectiveness), 
intended impacts, or objectives expressible in monetary terms (economic effectiveness). 
In contrast, we have proposed elsewhere an alternative analytical framework for project 
evaluation and a criterion of ‘human autonomy effectiveness’ to examine the effects of 
aid projects on the lives, opportunities and capacities of participants (Muñiz Castillo & 
Gasper, 2009). We consider human autonomy as a person’s capability to make reasoned 
choices in significant matters and achieve positive results in his or her life. A project is 
human-autonomy effective when it promotes an expansion of autonomy that allows peo-
ple to support and sustain their own development, in a way that does not constrain other 
priority capabilities. 
Individual autonomy can be studied in terms of three determinants: agency, the internal 
capacity to make reasoned choices and act accordingly; entitlements, here meaning in-
dividual access to inputs; and the multilevel structural contexts which support or con-
strain the exercise of autonomy. Projects could promote individual autonomy through 
supporting (i) a positive change in its determinants, and/or (ii) the achievement of per-
sonal goals, and/or (iii) the exercise of autonomy during the project cycle. In this paper, 
we focus on the first channel, while recognising that the other channels can indirectly 
influence agency.  
We explore how four aid projects have influenced the determinants of individual auton-
omy of local participants by examining their explicit and implicit logic, i.e., what was 
planned in official documents, what was done and how it was done. First, we elicit key 
assumptions behind their design and implementation. Then, we identify significant pro-
ject practices (forms of interaction and practical strategies) and, finally, we analyse their 
possible influence on the participants’ autonomy. 
The paper draws on a completed study (2004-8) of four projects in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador (Muñiz Castillo, 2009). Data used include project documents, public national 
reports, external statistics, stakeholders’ interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) 
and a small questionnaire survey (n=172). FGDs were the main way to understand the 
implicit logic of the four projects. They were crucial to obtain contextualised percep-
tions of autonomy and change and to explain possible project influences. Non-leaders 
and leaders were contacted separately. Leaders are people with strong influence on their 
neighbours, such as a community association office-holder, a school teacher or a priest. 
The analysis is interpretive, aiming at understanding changes in the lives of project par-
ticipants based on their own understandings. Qualitative analysis was complemented 
with quantitative analysis to triangulate data, produce complex data and explore alterna-
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tive hypotheses. Hypotheses raised by different FGDs and other stakeholders were pro-
gressively compared. 
Section 2 describes the four projects studied. Section 3 focuses on the projects’ stated 
purposes and implicit assumptions. Section 4 looks at the implicit theories signalled by 
specific practices. Section 5 explores how certain project practices could influence indi-
vidual autonomy. Section 6 concludes. 
2 The case studies: communities and projects 
The projects studied were executed between 1999 and 2005 with assistance from Lux-
embourg’s aid agency. They aimed at extending the access of households to infrastruc-
ture in water and sanitation (water projects) or housing and social services (reconstruc-
tion projects). The aid modality was bilateral grant, whose terms are agreed upon by the 
ministries of foreign affairs of the donor and the recipient countries. The formal coun-
terparts were the public water companies (for the water projects) or the municipal gov-
ernments (for the reconstruction projects).  
In most cases, the projects were managed as follows. The aid agency set up a project 
implementation unit (PIU) in the field, led by a foreign project chief. It coordinated the 
actions of local private constructors, supervisors, and NGOs subcontracted to execute 
different components of the projects. For the water projects, the public water companies 
were supervising and executing entities at the same time. 
Table 1: The four cases 
  Country 
  Nicaragua El Salvador 
Reconstruction 
Santa María 
(tragedy caused by a mudslide) 
05/1999 – 10/2001 
San Agustín 
(disaster caused by earthquakes) 
10/2001 – 03/2005 Sector 
Water 
San Fernando 
(deficit caused by Hurricane Mitch) 
09/2002 – 01/2005 
Agua Fría 
(structural deficit) 
10/2001 – 01/2004 
Note: The cases have the names of the localities, not of the projects (some projects covered several locali-
ties). Reasons for the need of aid appear between parentheses. The project execution periods in the spe-
cific localities are shown at the bottom of each cell. 
Table 1 presents the cases. In the reconstruction cases, the need for aid was due to dis-
asters. In 1998, the inhabitants of Santa María were living in two towns at the slopes of 
the Casitas volcano, when a mudslide fuelled by Hurricane Mitch wiped away their 
towns, killing many of their relatives and friends (2,513 people died). Survivors were 
relocated to Finca Santa María (a large farm) bought by several donors. For the inhabi-
tants of San Agustín, the earthquake brought material destruction; they lost their houses 
and social infrastructure. Both cases stirred up public attention due to the magnitude of 
the losses and the acute poverty of the residents. San Agustín is one of the poorest mu-
nicipalities of El Salvador, classified as marked by severe extreme poverty, the worst 
situation in a four-type classification (FLACSO, 2005). 
In the water cases, the infrastructure deficits were of a different nature. In San Fer-
nando, Hurricane Mitch badly damaged the existing drinking water system. In Agua 
Fría, a drinking water system had not been available and the earthquakes caused only 
minor damage to some houses. 
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2.1 The four communities before the projects 
The four localities are relatively small, each with between 350 and 500 households. 
However, San Agustín and San Fernando are municipal centres (headquarters of the 
municipal government and the mayor) so that they are better connected with other vil-
lages than are Agua Fría and Santa María, which are a canton and a colony, respec-
tively. Cantons, usually rural, are smaller parts of municipalities, and a colony is even 
smaller than a canton. 
To understand how people perceive the projects and their effects on their lives, it is nec-
essary to highlight some special features of the communities. In this study, community 
refers to individuals who live in the same territory or, even having emigrated, keep 
strong family ties in their locality.1 
In Santa María, the survivors of the Casitas disaster came from two different towns. 
There was no sense of shared community. People were too hurt by the mudslide and still 
grieving, without adequate psychological support; there was much uncertainty and ma-
terial lacks. New self-nominated leaders emerged and, grouped into a survivors’ asso-
ciation, led all reconstruction efforts. They even attempted to invade private lands to 
establish a new town, as many residents had done in 1979 during the agrarian reform. 
In San Agustín, there was an active, broad-based municipal committee, integrated by 
former guerrilla fighters, former soldiers, and cooperative leaders. This committee 
brought together local committees and had the support of an experienced NGO. It was 
coordinating all reconstruction projects in the municipality. The massive emigration 
caused by the civil war (1980-1992), which had reduced the population by more than 
two-thirds over two decades, had reversed since new projects started. 
Comparing these two cases, the disasters had different meanings. In Santa María, the 
disaster was a ‘tragedy’. In San Agustín, it was an ‘opportunity’ because foreign aid 
arrived promptly and leaders felt ready to take the necessary measures. 
In San Fernando, residents had had access to safe drinking water in the past and were 
dissatisfied with the public water company. There was no formal community organisa-
tion. Moreover, many people had supported the contra guerrillas during the 1980s and, 
since then, strong political divisions had emerged. People felt they were considered dif-
ferent and wealthier, for which they were abandoned by the state. The water project had 
a symbolic value for them: it was the first aid project that would benefit everyone. 
In Agua Fría, there was a development association and neighbourhood committees. 
Formal leaders were managing two gravity (untreated) water systems that covered a 
small part of the population. Moreover, they had searched for potable water alternatives 
with the municipality government and the public water company. However, the social 
context was affected by competition for the scarce water resource and growing insecu-
rity from the presence of youth gangs. 
Comparing these two cases, the main difference is the existence of formal community 
leaders in Agua Fría with management experience and remittance support, in contrast to 
the lack of interest of San Fernando residents in public affairs. 
                                                 
1 A community is not a homogenous group. Its members may share some values and have others in con-
flict. Within a poor community, individuals have different entitlements, life experiences and interests. 
They may interact in different formal or informal networks and, for this reason, have different perceptions 
of their community. However, shared history and social experiences influence the reality of individuals 
and their potential for autonomy expansions in each case. They influence the internal contexts of agency 
(i.e., personality and cultural context). See Muñiz Castillo, 2009. 
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With respect to relative affluence before the disasters, San Agustín was the poorest lo-
cality. People suffered long-term poverty associated with years of exclusion during and 
after the civil war. Agua Fría was the less poor locality given that most households re-
lied on remittances. The inhabitants of San Fernando had relatively better living stan-
dards than those of Santa María, living at the slopes of Casitas volcano. However, the 
latter enjoyed a life without acute lacks, based on self-consumption farming and NGO 
help. The mudslide of Casitas caused by Hurricane Mitch changed everything. 
Figure 1 compares the situation of the households in the four localities after the disas-
ters. Living standards differ across cases. In Agua Fría, households living in extreme 
poverty reach 17% of the total. In contrast, about 72% of households in Santa María live 
in extreme poverty2, as direct consequence of the 1998 tragedy. Having lost their lands, 
Santa María residents do any kind of work to survive. The lives of the households in the 
water cases (generally more affluent) were less affected by disasters. 
Figure 1: Cases compared by relative affluence and disaster impact 
Monetary affluence
Disaster impact
severe mild
poor affluent
SM
SM SA
SA
SF
SF
AF
AF
Reconstruction projects Water projects  
Legend: SM = Santa María, SA = San Agustín, SF = San Fernando, and AF = Agua Fría. 
Note: The arrow signals the fall in living standards of SM residents. 
In all four cases, before and after the projects, most households depend on agriculture 
activities despite the urban layout of some villages and the existence of seasonal migra-
tion. More than half of the survey respondents regarded themselves as farmers. House-
holds plan their activities in relation to agriculture. In order to support this activity, they 
invest resources such as communal solidarity work, children’s work and remittances 
savings. They partially overcome shortage periods related to the agriculture seasonality 
through migration, housemaid work or petty trade activities. 
2.2 An overview of the projects 
Despite the uniqueness of each in regard to location, institutional context or community 
dynamics, the cases have important similarities. First, the projects included a component 
of self-construction with two modalities. In the reconstruction projects, one member of 
each household worked in small teams (between five and six people) during two or 
three months as an assistant bricklayer to construct his or her house. In the water pro-
jects, each household built its home sanitation system to dispose of grey waters, assem-
bled their latrines with the guidance of bricklayers, and performed other works. Partici-
pants attended training sessions in groups (between 25 and 40 people) and worked in 
teams for other activities. 
Second, community organisations participated during the implementation of the four 
projects, although to different degrees. In most cases, they worked together with social 
promoters to mobilise their neighbours and supervise activities. The municipal commit-
                                                 
2 These rates are based on the questionnaire survey administered during the fieldwork, using official pov-
erty lines. 
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tee in San Agustín and the nascent communal committee in San Fernando were the most 
and least involved in the projects (see section 3.2). 
These features indicate that formulators considered that local participation was valu-
able, although the kind of participation was not explicit in all cases. It depended on sev-
eral factors related to intra-community relations, the local leaders’ management experi-
ence, and the relations between project staff and stakeholders (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). 
• The reconstruction projects 
Both reconstruction projects were complex (see Table 2). The main difference concerns 
project management. In Santa María, a NGO was hired to manage this project and two 
other projects funded by different donors. In San Agustín, a working group, formed by 
the project chief, two municipal committee members, and one representative of each 
partner NGO, was the main decision maker (see section 4.3). 
Table 2: Goals and results of the reconstruction projects 
Santa María 
(05/99–10/01) 
‐ Goal: Economic and social rehabilitation of households. 
‐ Components: Housing construction, water and agriculture (three different donors). 
‐ Main results: 
9 Tangible outputs were achieved. 
8 Agricultural project was not sustainable. 
8 Residents do not have the property titles of their houses. 
San Agustín 
(10/01-03/05) 
‐ Goal: Reduction of the vulnerability of the municipality. 
‐ Components: Housing, legalisation of property and participatory municipal planning. 
‐ Main results: 
9 Supported an ongoing process of social change. 
9 Good quality houses and social infrastructure. 
8 No effect on reducing the financial vulnerability of the local government. 
Extracted from Muñiz Castillo (2009, Table 10-2) 
In terms of tangible outputs, both projects (individually or with others) provided houses, 
schools, water service, and social infrastructure. Hence, they supported crucial needs 
related to physical security, health, relatedness and recreation, among others. 
The projects addressed differently two aspects important to participants: legal owner-
ship of the houses, and productive initiatives that could support their livelihoods. 
First, in Santa María, the municipality government could not register the property titles, 
so residents do not feel secure. In contrast, the project in San Agustín financed all the 
legal procedures, registering not only new property titles but also existing informally 
owned lands and undocumented citizens.3 
Second, only in Santa María was there an agricultural project which, however, did not 
succeed (see section 3.1). In San Agustín, the project did not support any productive 
project, although residents had identified several possible projects in the municipal plan. 
In fact, the projects had different emphases. The Santa María project centred on indi-
viduals and they needed an economic activity to mend their lives. San Agustín centred 
on local institutions. It aimed to support the management skills of leaders and munici-
pality staff so that these local actors could open up opportunities to residents (e.g., by 
preparing funding project proposals). 
 
                                                 
3 Some families had inherited lands from generations of colonos (former plantation workers) and had 
never registered their properties. Others simply could not afford the registration costs. Moreover, a fire in 
the municipality hall, during the civil war, destroyed many documents. 
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• The water projects 
The water projects were managed by a project implementation unit (PIU) and were pro-
posed and co-executed by the public water companies. An ongoing problem for both 
projects was the uncertainty about the authority, powers and duties of municipality gov-
ernments and about reforms in the water sector. Moreover, the Agua Fría project was 
affected by governance problems within the water company, which faced accusations of 
corruption, internal restructuring, and high staff rotation (LD, 2004; Herrera, 2003). 
Table 3 summarises the water projects. Both projects provided domiciliary water con-
nections, required home sanitation systems from households4, and organised training 
sessions to build small infrastructure or promote change in hygiene habits. In addition, 
the Agua Fría project financed latrines (here San Fernando had a lower, but some, cov-
erage) and ecological wood stoves for households, promoted diverse reforestation and 
soil protection activities, and supported the construction of a reservoir. 
Table 3: Goals and results of the water projects 
San Fernando 
(09/02-01/05) 
‐ Goal: Improvement of health and living conditions of residents. 
‐ Components: Water, sanitation; technical cooperation. 
‐ Main results: 
9 A permanent service and good quality water. 
9 Some women can participate in the municipal development committee. 
8 High water tariffs put at risk the entitlement to safe drinking water. 
Agua Fría 
(10/01-01/04) 
‐ Goal: Improvement of health and living conditions of residents. 
‐ Components: Water, sanitation, natural resources protection, fish agriculture. 
‐ Main results: 
9 Access to good quality water. 
8 Low operational effectiveness (unreliable water service). 
8 The intended micro-regional NGO was not legally constituted. 
Extracted from Muñiz Castillo (2009, Table 10-2) 
Both projects put in operation the water systems. The service is less reliable in Agua 
Fría due to problems within the water company and management challenges raised by a 
project design that covered too many activities (see section 4.1). 
3 Looking into the projects’ stated purposes and implicit assumptions 
A logical framework states that certain effects will result if the intended outputs are pro-
duced. However, some important pre-conditions are not always considered and/or not 
always justified. This section elaborates on three key assumptions that were made in the 
cases studied. 
3.1 Project Assumption: ‘It is possible to create an agricultural community model’ 5 
‘We were sent to those lands to sow rice and to plant stumps…. Whoever worked had the 
right to receive food.’ (A man in Santa María) 
In Santa María, the land assigned to survivors of the mudslide was divided in two areas, 
one for houses and social infrastructure (25 ha.) and the other for agriculture activities 
(41 ha.). The second area was a joint tenancy. Households had to construct the houses 
and plant in this communal land. The agricultural project started several months before 
                                                 
4 In both countries, it is a norm that rural households connected to water systems have a home sanitation 
system so that grey waters infiltrate to the soil and do not contaminate the environment. 
5 The phrase comes from one of the donors who financed the purchase of Finca Santa María, where survi-
vors were relocated after the mudslide (Trolese, 1999, ¶ 6). 
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the housing project and had positive short-term results. Residents planted vegetables 
and fruits. They were trained and received inputs and equipment. 
The decision to implement this project as a communal landholding was made by donors 
during the formulation. From field interviews, it seems that donors or formulators 
wanted to (i) secure food for landless survivors who had to start planting as soon as pos-
sible, or (ii) promote union between people who needed to work together to advance. In 
addition, communal farming was considered feasible given the high levels of organisa-
tion shown by survivors during the emergency period. But, there was one implicit as-
sumption: residents could develop a sense of community and work together. 
In reality, they did not trust each other. Each household would have preferred bigger 
individual lots to cultivate and to raise farm animals. One man expressed this: 
‘We have a roof but we do not have a space to work, to sow. The houses need to be 
enlarged [because] the family grows…. There is no space to go around the house so that 
children can play. We only can cultivate little things.’ 
People were disenchanted with a cooperative model, after the failed experience of the 
Sandinista cooperatives. However, the project secured participation in the agricultural 
project by providing extrinsic motivation: people would receive food if they worked. 
Table 4 (to be read from left to right) shows a partial assessment matrix that looks at 
expected and actual changes in the determinants of autonomy and their possible causes 
(Muñiz Castillo & Gasper, 2009). In this case, the matrix focuses on the entitlements 
(just one of the determinants) of project participants through the agricultural project. 
Table 4: (Partial) assessment matrix for the agricultural project in Santa María 
 PROJECT LOGIC ACTUAL EFFECTS 
(i) Determinants 
of autonomy 
(ii) Hypotheses on 
effects 
(iii) Expected condi-
tions 
(iv) Actual situation (v) Assessment of 
effects 
Households restart 
their economic ac-
tivities. 
Communal produc-
tive projects secure 
subsistence. 
Entitlements 
To natural and 
material re-
sources Assumptions: 
-The management of the common land and 
rotating loan system is effective. 
-Cultural change: families value a coop-
erative model. 
-Weather conditions are favourable. 
-The agricultural 
project failed due to 
climatic shocks and 
bad management. 
-People prefer to 
work individually 
and devise their own 
survival strategies. 
-No common use of 
resources. 
-Lowered felt com-
petence (‘we failed’).
The project’s logical framework did not include any explicit assumptions on these factors and links. 
For a description of the elements of the matrix, see Muñiz Castillo & Gasper (2009, Table 2). 
The implicit assumptions did not hold. A severe drought (2001/2002) and management 
problems troubled the project. The revolving fund only lasted one year and many people 
suspected bad handling of common resources by leaders. They were not willing to work 
together again because ‘[t]here, everything gets lost’ (a woman). Residents parcelled out 
the communal land. Only a few people work in groups, supported by a local church. 
Many people feel less competent because they failed. ‘Those green fields should be wa-
tered, [but] no one does anything’, remarked one man. Not taking into account the par-
ticipants’ values, socio-historical experiences and intra-community relations made the 
agricultural project unsustainable. 
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3.2 Project Assumption: A formal community organisation assures the sustainabil-
ity of project effects 
‘To assure the durability of the project effects, the partners [NGOs] will take charge of or-
ganising and advising local committees…. The participation of local population… will be 
promoted and considered a guarantee for the durability of the actions.’ (LD, 2001a, p. 33) 
It was expected that the participation of community organisations in project activities 
would improve the sustainability of positive outcomes. We analyse which kind of par-
ticipation they had. First, the role of each community organisation was different (see 
Table 5). 
Table 5: Participation of community organisations by locality (at different project stages) 
Reconstruction projects Water projects Project stage Santa María San Agustín San Fernando Agua Fría 
Formulation 2 3 0 1 
Implementation 3 3 2 2 
Evaluation 0 1 1 1 
Ratings: 0=leaders were not informed, 1=leaders were informed or consulted, 2=the extent of decision-
making was low, and 3=the extent of decision-making was high. 
Source: Individual interviews, FGDs and project documents (using iterative cross-checking) 
At the formulation stage, only in San Agustín did community leaders make decisions 
through a participatory formulation (section 4.1). The self-nominated leaders of Santa 
María had an active role during the emergency, but after many discussions and a ‘pa-
rade’ of donors, decisions on project design were top-down (e.g., on village layout). The 
leaders in Agua Fría were only consulted over taking up the project as designed, but this 
decision was very significant to them. 
At the implementation stage, in the water projects the community leaders carried out 
functions similar to those of social promoters. In this way, project staff became more 
familiar to aid recipients, and also transferred some costs to the leaders (cf., Cooke & 
Kothari, 2004). In San Fernando, leaders felt ‘happy, but very sweaty because [they] 
had to count, to have a list of all the materials...’ (a woman leader). The leaders in the 
reconstruction projects were more involved. However, while in San Agustín their role 
was positive and constant, it became disruptive in Santa María due to political interests 
(Ausín Cantero, 2001a; 2001b). 
At the evaluation stage, the leaders in the water projects were only informed about pro-
ject results even though they wanted to discuss and solve issues such as the explosion of 
pipes (in Agua Fría) and the high water tariffs (in San Fernando). There were no evalua-
tion workshops in the reconstruction projects, but leaders in San Agustín were informed 
through the project chief. 
Second, the community organisations differed with respect to its length of existence, 
management experience, political and financial support, and social support from resi-
dents. However, across cases, there was no link between the past organisational experi-
ence and the degree of involvement granted to community leaders in the projects. 
The type of community organisation is related to the type of locality (see Figure 2). San 
Agustín had one municipal committee and development association per canton, repre-
sented in such a committee. Agua Fría had one development association (because the 
project covered one canton) and neighbourhood committees. In Santa María, the survi-
vors’ association was the main local actor. In San Fernando, neighbourhood committees 
were formed during the project and grouped into a communal committee. 
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Figure 2: Type of community organisation during the projects 
Municipal development 
committee
Communal development 
association or committee
Neighbourhood committees
San Agustín (existing)
Agua Fría (existing)
Santa María (existing)
San Fernando (in formation)
San Fernando (formed 
during the project)  
The development association in Agua Fría had more experience than the organisations 
in San Agustín or Santa María, but it was only given a role supportive to achievement of 
pre-defined project goals. This situation occurred even though: (i) the social context in 
Agua Fría was more favourable than in San Agustín, where residents were harmed by 
the civil war, or in Santa María, where the social capital had vanished with the tragedy, 
and (ii) the households’ economic situation in Agua Fría was much better due to family 
remittances. 
A possible explanation is the composition and commitment of project staff and the 
spaces open for community involvement. In San Agustín, a committed project chief led 
the activities with the working group. In Santa María, there was no project chief. The 
NGO that was responsible for managing three parallel projects needed the support of the 
association because it was understaffed. In both cases, the community organisations 
were the (informal) local counterparts of the projects given that the magnitude of the 
disasters exceeded the capacities and resources of the municipality governments, espe-
cially in Santa María (CENIDH, 1998; Envío team, 1998). In Agua Fría, the project 
chief had low visibility in comparison to the water company. When the latter faced gov-
ernance problems (section 2.2), project staff focused on finishing the project rather than 
truly strengthening local organisations. 
Third, community organisations supported the projects’ operational effectiveness but 
not necessarily the participants’ autonomy, which is required for sustained positive im-
pact (Ellerman, 2006). The logframes of the water projects linked ‘the strengthening of 
community organisations’ to the expected project output: ‘the population is sensitised to 
the “water, health and environment” issue’. The project logic was as follows: 
Community organisation  Operational effectiveness  Sustainability of outputs 
Leaders were to help to achieve the project outputs and to secure their sustainability; but 
in reality leaders had low involvement in project decisions. How could this logic work? 
• Complex local governance prevented the creation of a NGO in Agua Fría 
‘We were three communities as if we were just one. Three communities united are powerful 
like the little ants that work together.’ (A woman in Agua Fría) 
In the Agua Fría water case, in order to assure the sustainability of outputs, project staff 
focused on setting up a ‘stronger’ community organisation. Two elements not originally 
planned were introduced. First, project staff supported the creation of a NGO formed by 
leaders from the development association and two neighbourhood committees, who 
were working like ‘little ants’. Second, the reservoir intended to water livestock during 
the dry season was adapted to host a small fish farming project proposed by local lead-
ers, with the aim of generating the resources to cover the NGO’s operating expenses. 
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None of the conditions required for reaching the expected outcomes occurred (Table 6). 
Table 6: Assessment matrix for the community organisation in Agua Fría 
 PROJECT LOGIC ACTUAL EFFECTS 
(i) Determinants 
of autonomy 
(ii) Hypotheses on 
effects 
(iii) Expected condi-
tions 
(iv) Actual situation (v) Assessment of 
effect 
Strengthening of 
community organisa-
tion to carry out 
future projects. 
-Three associations 
grouped into a NGO 
work for the progress 
of the canton. 
-The fish agriculture 
project secures re-
sources for the NGO.
Local context: 
Community 
organisation 
Assumptions: 
-Intra-community relations are not hurt by 
political interests. 
-The relation between community leaders 
and political leaders is fair. 
-Weather conditions are favourable. 
-Security conditions do not get worse. 
-There are some 
divisions between 
villages. 
-The conflict with 
the mayor has en-
dured. 
-The planned micro-
regional NGO was 
not formalised. 
-Leaders rely on 
their own resources. 
-No significant ef-
fect. 
-Leaders had an 
instrumental role to 
support project ac-
tivities and outputs. 
The project’s logical framework did not include any explicit assumptions on these links and conditions. 
First, the mayor did not support the constitution of the NGO, which was therefore never 
legally registered.6 The adverse national context (section 2.2), and an impasse between 
project formulators and the mayor, had led to the voluntary separation of the latter from 
project activities. A woman reflected: 
‘The mayor did not help us…. When he realised that [he could not] manage the project, he 
did not attend the meetings anymore. They [leaders] did all the arrangements, but we lacked 
his signature to form the community association, which is very important for the commu-
nity. He said he did not know us.’ 
Project staff was unable to promote consensus between the main stakeholders. Uninten-
tionally, the project reduced the options of residents to sustain their own development. 
Second, the fish agriculture project failed because the reservoir overflowed due to heavy 
rains, some people stole the adult fish or ‘[fish] were eaten by some people of the com-
munity’ (a woman). Moreover, residents lacked the funds to pay a private guard and set 
up a security hut, necessary because the area was insecure. This failure harmed every-
one, but especially leaders because they invested the most in terms of time, physical 
effort, and money. 
The Agua Fría project could not formalise a stronger community organisation. More-
over, leaders could not assure the sustainability of the outcomes in health and sanitation. 
They were confused about the use of the home sanitation systems because of their lack 
of interest since the start. If they had made decisions and understood their importance, 
they could have sustained positive impacts, for instance, adapting the systems’ design to 
the soil quality. 
Next, we look at the San Agustín case, which illustrates the positive role that a project 
can have on local structural contexts. 
 
                                                 
6 Project staff and community leaders wanted to form a micro-regional NGO based on three community 
development associations (ADESCOs). There was only one ADESCO before the project. To have legal 
standing, the two new associations had to be legally recognised by the local government. They were not. 
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• The municipal committee in San Agustín was effectively supported by the project 
‘A strengthening of self-worth, awareness of the latent potentialities of the community and 
confidence in their own capacities by the actors [that would allow them, with the adequate 
training,] to propose, manage and implement future interventions and projects by them-
selves’ (LD, 2001c, ¶ 101) 
The above statement reflects an intended project effect. This project supported a com-
munity already living a change process; residents were gradually re-valuing the need for 
organisation. The project aimed at improving ‘the labour, organisation and management 
capacities of the actors and beneficiaries’ (ibid, ¶ 213). Its logical framework included 
concrete assumptions on a good disposition of community organisations, political lead-
ers and non-leaders to participate, and on local authorities’ willingness to let the asso-
ciations negotiate and manage projects freely. 
However, most importantly, the project chief motivated community and political leaders 
to work together and so worked for the fulfilment of those assumptions. He supported 
leaders in building relations with formal institutions and in making joint decisions in the 
working group. He maintained close links with the NGO, known by leaders since 1999. 
This NGO developed a function of ‘social intermediation’ (Bennett et. al., 1996, cited in 
Thorp et al., 2005, p. 912). It supported the continuous development of leaders’ skills 
(e.g., by courses on organisation and law), guided and monitored the process of the mu-
nicipal development plan, facilitated the links between leaders and the local govern-
ment, joined the working group of the project at times and participated in the general 
assembly of the municipal committee as a nonvoting member. Overall, the project chief 
was a catalyst. A woman leader reported: ‘he put his intelligence and his heart’. 
3.3 Project Assumption: The manual work of beneficiaries favours their ownership 
of the projects 
‘Here, no one can say “this house was given to me like that”, rather, it cost quite some sacri-
fice to everyone.’ (A woman in San Agustín) 
‘They planned the reforestation project. In winter, they sowed trees and watered them. But, 
in summer, how were they going to water? They did not obtain any benefit but spent 
money.’ (A man in Agua Fría) 
The participation of beneficiaries in project activities was expected to support project 
outputs because beneficiaries would put the interest that only an owner not a third-party 
has to carry out and monitor on-site activities. Moreover, manual work was seen as a 
local contribution to the project budgets and a signal of commitment. Below, we de-
velop four arguments against this assumption, as too simple and unconditional. 
First, felt ownership was related to the importance of the need addressed by the project. 
Residents accepted to work to get a house or a water connection because they valued 
physical security and health. They wanted ‘to make [their] houses beautiful’ (a man in 
Santa María) because they would live there and they worked very hard because ‘other-
wise, [they] could not afford a house like that one’ (a woman). 
Participants in the water projects valued having (in Agua Fría) or regaining (in San Fer-
nando) access to safe drinking water, but they have not valued other project outputs as 
much, such as home sanitation systems or reforestation activities. For instance, the man 
in Agua Fría (cited above) perceives that the lack of sustainability of the reforestation 
activities was a loss for outsiders (‘they’), not for him or his neighbours. 
 12
Second, participation has a broader meaning than manual work. Muñiz Castillo (2009) 
used an ‘involvement index’ to explore the kind of participation of (non-leader) benefi-
ciaries, based on questions related to information, opinions, skill awareness, opportuni-
ties and decisions during the project. The levels of involvement were relatively low in 
all cases (mean value = 1.2, in a 0-3 scale).7 However, survey respondents qualified 
participation as ‘fair’ (in an ordinal scale: low, fair and high). It seems that they under-
stood participation in terms of workload or to what extent they worked in project activi-
ties as committed. Not surprisingly, the survey respondents in the reconstruction pro-
jects felt they had participated more than those in the water projects: 41% versus 27% of 
respondents, respectively, regarded their participation as high. However, reconstruction 
project participants did not feel more involved than water project participants. Manual 
work was not translated into high felt involvement and commitment. 
On the contrary, high project workload restricted the options of many people to partici-
pate in other important activities related to their community development and, most 
crucially for the poorest, to secure their own subsistence (cf., Osti, 2004). A man in San 
Agustín recalls: ‘Here, one felt that one was not going to earn for oneself… One worked 
here and down there [in the plot]… I felt that it was a lot [of work].’ Hence, when bene-
ficiaries in San Agustín were called for voluntary work to construct the common social 
buildings, they were too tired to attend. Was this a signal of lack of ownership or com-
mitment to their community? This leads us to the next point. 
Third, when subsistence is threatened, people may give up the means (satisfiers) to fulfil 
other needs (e.g., physical security or health) if they cannot afford to hold those means. 
Then, giving up resources provided by a project does not necessarily reflect a lack of 
ownership. For instance, in Santa María, people worked hard and valued their houses, 
but many had to search for jobs outside the colony given that they had lost their lands 
after the mudslide and could not make a living from agriculture anymore. Toward the 
project completion, a commission decided that only those who were living in their 
houses would keep them.8 This practice forced many to return, put at risk their survival 
and harmed their autonomy, already constrained by deprivation. Four years later, about 
one-third of the houses were uninhabited; people had (re-) migrated to sustain their 
families. Survival was a more pressing need than physical security. As Cernea (1997) 
points out, for farmers the ‘loss of land generally has far more severe consequences than 
the loss of a house’ (p. 1573). 
Four, ownership is rooted in personal conviction, influenced by external events. People 
with autonomy causality orientation (Deci & Ryan, 1985; 2000) want more than only 
working hard, they want to be involved in decisions that affect their lives. This interest 
is a signal of ownership, which is not created but only supported or not by projects (de 
Valk, Apthorpe & Guimarães, 2005; Ellerman, 2006). However, ownership could be 
harmed if project contexts are strongly controlling, that is, if managements exert much 
pressure or induce behaviour toward specific outcomes. For instance, many home sani-
tation systems in both water projects have not worked well. Some participants stated 
that they knew these systems would not work, but they did not have option to make de-
                                                 
7 The questions about involvement were asked to 231 respondents at a first stage of the fieldwork activi-
ties to recruit focus group participants, which were split in groups of high- and low-involvement. The 
index was the mean of the ratings assigned to five questions. The values for the four projects statistically 
behaved in similar ways (Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks). 
8 The project design indicated that participants had to keep their houses at least two years before getting 
their deeds (to be financed by other donor). For those who did not live in their assigned houses, the com-
mission offered a monetary compensation, which was considered low by participants. 
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sign changes that would suit their reality. Besides, ‘when a project is already defined, it 
has to be done’ (a NGO coordinator in Agua Fría). When people do not use and main-
tain the systems well, they tend to blame the quality of the infrastructure and not them-
selves (see section 4.2). 
4 Identifying implicit theories signalled by project practices 
Project practices reveal the theories, the implicit logic, assumed by the projects. In this 
section, we illustrate four kinds of practices with examples from the cases studied. 
4.1 Selection and design practices 
‘We believe that constructing with mutual help improves the organisation and the relations 
among neighbours.’ (A community leader in San Agustín) 
‘The participation of the residents was limited in quantity and quality. The diagnosis was 
induced toward the activities of the project, [and it was] perceived like a promotion of its 
activities. In other words, the residents did not have options on what to discuss.’ (CODECA, 
2003a, p. 22) 
The participation of local stakeholders in the design of a project could vary from merely 
being informed to jointly defining the main aspects of the project (cf., Arnstein, 1969). 
Moreover, similar expressions of participation can have different effects on project out-
comes and participants’ autonomy in different contexts.9 In this section, we discuss two 
cases that aimed at a participatory approach: San Agustín and Agua Fría. 
In San Agustín, there was participatory formulation. Formal community leaders defined 
the selection criteria, the model and materials of the houses, and selected the partner 
institutions and the social infrastructure to be built. In a first stage, meetings were held 
and representatives from each local association brought their designs and discussed 
them in assembly. In the second stage, the consultant met municipal committee leaders, 
local and government authorities, the priest, representatives of the vice-ministry of 
housing and other public institutions. To select the construction materials, leaders vis-
ited ten houses built with different construction materials (LD, 2001b). Finally, they 
chose the use of reinforced concrete, which they regarded as safer. All this was possible 
because the municipal committee had elaborated a development action plan (MSA, 
2001) before the earthquakes struck, so that leaders were prepared to lead the efforts 
and propose alternatives. 
In contrast, in Agua Fría, an intended participatory diagnosis was distorted by the local 
perception of likely project deliverables (cf., Mosse, 2004; 2005). The project was de-
signed by outsiders; local leaders only remember to have been consulted. Participants 
could not introduce certain aspects that they valued, such as being able to work with 
credit or having access to good education and health care services. However, the small 
fish farming project (section 3.2) illustrates that leaders gained a certain influence on 
project decisions over time, especially when the role of the water company weakened. 
Moreover, the Agua Fría project was complex; it became a ‘pseudo-comprehensive’ 
project (Hirschman, 1967/1995). Table 7 compares the activities of the two water pro-
jects. 
                                                 
9 See Cooke and Kothari (eds., 2004) and Hickey and Mohan (eds., 2004) for cases that illustrate positive 
and negative sides of ‘participation’. 
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Table 7: Comparison of project activities: San Fernando (SF) and Agua Fría (AF) 
 Water 
service 
Sanitation 
systems 
Latrines Reforestation Soil protec-
tion  
Solid wastes 
mgmt. 
Reservoir Eco-wood 
stoves 
SF Yes Yes Yes (-) Yes No Yes No No 
AF Yes (-) Yes (-) Yes Yes (+) Yes No Yes Yes 
Legend: (-) means that the project had a worse performance or lower coverage, (+) means that the activi-
ties were much greater in quantity and coverage 
The Agua Fría design was well intended but included very many elements. Project staff 
lost track of technical aspects affecting the project’s operational effectiveness, in a cli-
mate of reorganisation of the formal counterpart, and did not engage local stakeholders 
who could have supported the project outcomes (section 3.2). The residents face con-
tinuous problems with the water system and cannot solve them, as a man expresses: 
‘There have been like seven [water] leakages from Piedra Gorda to Trinchera. The last 
time, they had to break the paving stones of the road in order to fix the pipeline.’ 
4.2 Conditionality practices 
‘They did their work grumbling and grumbling.’ (A social promoter in San Fernando) 
‘The project was not gone because we stuck together.’ (A group of leaders in San Fernando) 
For non-leaders, the main condition to benefit from the projects was to work in project 
activities. In San Fernando, new leaders felt compelled to participate in order to keep 
the project. Instead of favouring ownership (section 3.3), this work could have only 
served to achieve project outputs, at a relatively low cost. Fortunately, the interpersonal 
context and the institutional support of the mayor favoured the continuity of the leaders’ 
efforts after the project. 
Across cases, working in project activities could be differently interpreted by partici-
pants and have different effects on their autonomy. They could interpret their work as: 
1. A condition imposed by an external entity, that has to be fulfilled, independently of one’s 
opinion (e.g., ‘we had to do it’; ‘our opinions were not taken into account’; ‘they [leaders] 
decided for us’); 
2. The fulfilment of an agreement to achieve a valuable goal, but they are doing what they 
are supposed to do (e.g., ‘it was our contribution’; ‘I did everything that was asked for’); 
3. The fulfilment of an agreement that brings happiness and pride because they are making 
an effort to improve their own life (e.g., ‘we did not leave the project to decay’; ‘San 
Agustín for San Agustín’); 
4. The fulfilment of an agreement whose process (the work) they are enjoying because they 
are learning a new skill, engaging with people ‘bigger than them’, sharing experiences 
with neighbours or working together. 
The extent to which individuals agree with any of the previous interpretations depends 
on how they internalise their commitments (Ryan & Deci, 2006). In the first case, there 
is no internalisation; people perceive their tasks solely as obligations, because they did 
not share in the decision to do them or, if they did, the contexts were so controlling that 
they felt they were working for someone else, not for themselves. Some people in Santa 
María perceived that their manual work became a commodity to be provided uniformly, 
without attention to special cases, for which they did not get a ‘fair’ compensation. Fur-
thermore, expressing their opinions did not help much, as a woman recounts: ‘We chose 
among the three models… we were considerate and chose that one in the middle… but 
they [the engineer and bricklayers] made the worst, the one that they wanted.’ 
 15
In the second case, people know that an agreement (in which they participated, directly 
or through their leaders) was reached because the final outcome is valuable. However, 
the activities linked to this agreement became obligations. In the water projects, partici-
pants highly valued the water connection and latrines, but they also worked on every-
thing requested (e.g., sanitation systems, woodstoves) in order to get water. 
In the third case, people are fulfilling a commitment, but they ‘have in sight’ the out-
come. They feel happiness and pride because there is something in reach that they can 
do to help themselves and their community. They are intrinsically motivated. This is the 
case for most people in San Agustín and some in Santa María. It is also the case for 
work squads in Agua Fría while constructing the reservoir; people were highly moti-
vated, for raising fish in the reservoir was their initiative, not the project’s. 
In the fourth case, people also enjoy the process of working together. This was the case 
for many women in San Fernando and Agua Fría. They shared time in training sessions, 
organised themselves for activities (e.g., a garbage carnival in San Fernando) or told 
other people about their experience (e.g., field trips in Agua Fría). It was less common 
in the reconstruction projects, which had harder work conditions. 
This discussion confirms that the internalisation of work commitments depends on the 
project contexts, in addition to personality factors. Contexts can make an initially inter-
nalised commitment feel like an external imposition. For instance, hard and long work-
days had different effects in San Agustín and Santa María. In San Agustín, there was a 
charismatic and committed project chief and residents trusted the donor that had funded 
another project in the past. In contrast, the residents in Santa María did not feel support 
from the executing NGO (and the donor was very distant), while management problems 
caused uncertainty about crucial project features. For many, motivation was externalised 
and their perceived agency was harmed. 
Local perceptions of the role of community organisations in defining crucial project 
features (or a project itself) also influence the internalisation of work commitments, 
depending on the cultural role of leaders and their representativeness. Some people pre-
fer and are confident to delegate crucial decisions to leaders and respect their agree-
ments. This seems the case in San Agustín and Agua Fría in contrast to San Fernando 
(no previous organisation) or Santa María (self-nominated leaders). However, the dele-
gation of decision-making and respectful attitudes might cover-up long-lasting social 
inequalities (Cleaver, 2004). On the other hand, people could ignore how decisions are 
made, due to specific community dynamics. For instance, in San Agustín, some people 
considered that project staff had a larger weight in decision-making than leaders so that 
fulfilling their work commitments was a sign of gratefulness. This perception was re-
lated to the high visibility of the project chief and poor information sharing between 
leaders and non-leaders due to the insecure local context and the hierarchical nature of 
the relations between the municipal committee, development associations and non-
leaders. 
4.3 Coordination practices 
Structural contexts at different levels are important for identifying coordination chal-
lenges. At the international level, the degree of aid dependence of a country determines 
its relations with donors. Nicaragua is heavily aid dependent.10 At the national level, 
                                                 
10 In year 2005, according to OECD (2008), ODA represented 15.4% of GNI for Nicaragua and 1.2% of 
GNI for El Salvador. Furthermore, 71% of public investments were financed by foreign loans or grants in 
Nicaragua (GON, 2006). 
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ongoing decentralisation of public functions and reforms in the water sector affected the 
relations between municipality authorities and public water companies. 
The four projects had different coordination practices, which were related to (i) their 
organisational structure, entities involved, reporting chains, and responsibilities; (ii) 
their goals, which differed in number, complexity, and coverage of population and terri-
tory; and (iii) the informal relations that actually sustained the projects. Coordination 
was more challenging in the reconstruction cases. These projects were complex, re-
quired high negotiation skills from project staff and also creativity and flexibility to deal 
with many actors and multiple uncertainties. However, project staff also had more room 
to manoeuvre and engage actors. In contrast, the pre-defined role of the public water 
companies as local counterpart, executing and supervisory entities, constrained the 
range of possible coordination practices in the water projects. 
The San Agustín case was the only case where the community organisation acted as a 
partner of project staff, sharing in relevant decision-making. Figure 3 shows the central 
role that the working group had in the functioning of this project. 
Figure 3: The organisational structure of the San Agustín project 
PIU*
Municipality 
government
Construction NGO
Property titles
CRDM
Legal NGO Facilitating NGO
Local development
Working group
Legend: Management
Coordination              Collaboration
Social housing
* PIU: Project Implementation Unit  
The working group was the main decision-maker. Within it, the project chief had the 
leading role, assisted by the president of the municipal committee. They coordinated the 
actions of the NGOs in charge of the registration of property titles and the construction 
of houses and social buildings. These NGOs also belonged to the working group, but 
with a secondary role. The facilitating NGO (the one supporting the elaboration of the 
municipal plan) participated at times in the weekly meetings of the working group. The 
project chief institutionalised a consensus building style, by which each entity had the 
chance to contribute or complain. 
Many entities were directed or indirectly related to the project. The number of contacts 
increased because the project chief decided (i) to support the community organisation 
much more than the terms of reference had indicated, and (ii) to provide houses to as 
many people as possible despite the complexity of their legal situation, for instance by 
looking for land donors or alternative housing solutions (e.g., prefabricated houses). 
Coordination was difficult because of the initial lack of support of political authorities, 
public bureaucracies and private companies and the lack of administrative staff in the 
PIU. But as the project progressed, the departmental government and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of El Salvador became facilitators of the project at the national level. 
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4.4 Accountability practices: processes and outcomes 
Accountability can be analysed with respect to (i) processes, where the focus is on ac-
tivities, responsibilities, roles, and monitoring and evaluation, or (ii) outcomes, where 
the focus is on the relevance of the impacts. 
Only in the San Agustín case was there mutual accountability with respect to processes 
between project staff and community leaders. The municipal committee was able to 
hold the mayor accountable given its increased access to information about the project 
and the municipality’s financial situation. 
In the other cases, with much lower involvement of leaders in the project (section 3.2), 
accountability was also lower. The Santa María case illustrates a situation worsened by 
organisational design problems: a subcontracted NGO coordinated three parallel pro-
jects from different donors, while being understaffed and without adequate monitoring 
by some of donors or the municipal government. The San Fernando case signals how 
accountability for outcomes can be reduced when there is no accountability for proc-
esses. 
• Poor accountability in Santa María harmed individual autonomy 
‘Although the little house was like that, what could we do? We had to receive it anyhow 
because we needed it.’ (A woman in Santa María) 
The residents of Santa María saw themselves as partners of the executing NGO because 
they worked together. However, there was neither accountability with respect to proc-
esses, because residents were not even well-informed of decisions (made by external 
bodies), nor accountability with respect to outcomes when the outputs were not satisfac-
tory. They are very grateful because they got a house, but their expectations were not 
fully met. They had no choice but to accept conditionality practices (section 4.2). Non-
leaders could not find a receptive actor to whom to complain, while leaders tended to 
use the general dissatisfaction as a tool to pressurise project staff. Years after this hous-
ing project and other projects were completed, a woman reflects: ‘Now we realise that, 
one, we have our house, and two, we have to do and consent to do what they [leaders] 
request us… because we [do not want] to have shortage’. Their poor living standards 
and lack of voice results in reduced autonomy. 
Regarding the project outputs, one-half of the survey respondents in Santa María re-
ported being very satisfied with the quality of their houses and no one reported being 
completely dissatisfied. The apparent suppression by some people of their complaints 
about housing may reflect the tense climate and damaged personal agency (including 
emotional distress) linked to the terrible disaster. In addition, the project did not finance 
the legalisation of the properties (section 2.2). To residents, this means that the project 
is unfinished. They feel insecure because they do not know how and when they will get 
their deeds. A woman explains: ‘I sometimes think that I can be left… with the suitcase 
along the highway because… when one does not have the legal title, [it] is like not hav-
ing anything’. 
• Accountability for outcomes at risk in San Fernando 
‘When one has some pennies to eat, already one has to set them aside to pay the water. 
What is left? Stay hungry in order to pay; otherwise, they could cut off [the water service].’ 
(A woman in San Fernando) 
Most people in San Fernando felt satisfied over the regained access to potable water, but 
many had trouble to pay the water bills. Participants in all focus group discussions and 
 18
30% of the survey respondents complained about the bills and several households were 
having their water cut off (5% of the total, reported a woman leader). The situation 
highlights three problems: the application of a financial sustainability criterion to define 
water tariffs for a poor population, the initial mistrust of residents toward the project, 
and implementation gaps. 
Given that most residents are income-poor, the project staff had identified the need for a 
tariff subsidy. It presented a proposal to the water company to subsidise 20% of the 
households, assuring the financial viability of the water system (i.e., the projected reve-
nues covered the operation and maintenance costs). However, more people needed the 
subsidy, for the proposal underestimated the poverty rates. It stated that 5% of the 
households were extremely poor and 38% were poor, while official poverty rates were 
30% and 69% of the inhabitants, respectively (Muñiz Castillo, 2009). The project’s es-
timates were based on a socio-economic census made at the start of the project and a 
household budget survey, but project staff suspected that people underreported their 
revenues in the census. So these revenues were adjusted with survey data on expendi-
ture and census data on physical house condition (ibid, Box 8-1). Indeed residents had 
not collaborated with interviewers, who were strangers to them, did not trust the project 
would become a reality and did not know the purpose of the census (a woman leader). 
Further, the water company had no presence in the promotion team. Belatedly organised 
workshops about water consumption and payments did not reach everyone or the mes-
sage was not well explained (LD, 2005). People were confused: ‘the month that I saved 
water, I paid the most’ (a man). Besides, water meters were not tested on site when de-
livered. The high water bills added more discredit to the water company. A woman 
leader states: ‘projects should not go to the hands of [the water company], but to the 
municipality government because the mayor would set a [fixed] tariff and we would 
agree to work all together’. 
In sum, not all households had entitlement to safe drinking water given their low pay-
ment capacity.11 This harms individuals’ autonomy. First, some people make sacrifices 
to pay the bills thus harming their health through not being well-fed. Second, some 
households use alternative non-safe water sources, such as river water, to control their 
expenses so that ‘people have diseases again because the river is dirty’ (a man). In addi-
tion, the nascent community organisation was weakened because the project was con-
sidered by participants as too little successful in securing water access for all residents. 
5 Exploring influences of project practices on individual autonomy 
The projects had varied effects on the determinants of autonomy: entitlements, agency 
and structural contexts. First, the most direct effect was on resources: provision of tan-
gible project outputs such as houses, water services, home sanitation systems or wood 
stoves. However, people do not always use them in a way that supports their autonomy. 
For instance, those people who considered building the home sanitation systems as a 
duty (linked to conditionality practices) do not use and maintain them well, so that the 
effects on health are not as expected. 
Moreover, resources provided by projects are not always accessible. Entitlements are 
based not only on legal ownership or rights, but also on social legitimisation. In San 
                                                 
11 Everyone should have access to safe drinking water to promote their well-being, for equity reasons, but 
at the same time someone must pay. Our argument is that a decentralised water system managed by a 
community organisation or by a municipal government serving a poor community requires the support of 
a central water operator (or regulator) that transfers resources from surplus to deficit water systems. 
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Fernando, some residents do not have their entitlement to safe drinking water secured, 
given their low payment capacity (section 4.4). In Santa María, communal land was 
available for the project, but residents had to use it in one specific way: planting to-
gether as a cooperative (section 3.1). Years later, they parcelled it out, although they 
hardly subsist with such small pieces of land and without credit. 
Second, projects also supported personal agency as participants learned new skills, es-
pecially through their work as bricklayer assistants. Some men worked in reconstruction 
projects in nearby areas, were hired by project staff to construct the social buildings, or 
constructed small infrastructure in the water projects. However, the physical health and 
strength of some people in the reconstruction projects could have been harmed because 
they could not support themselves (section 3.3), thus delaying the works and also affect-
ing interpersonal relations, in opposition to the intended positive effect of building rela-
tions. 
In fact, projects that include self-construction activities could have several effects on 
perceived agency – how capable individuals feel that they are to undertake new endeav-
ours or just to manage their lives under the circumstances in which they are (Muñiz 
Castillo, 2009). On the one hand, people could become aware of latent capacities or 
develop new ones. In Agua Fría, men gain this awareness from construction activities 
and women from sharing their experiences (e.g., how to use the ecological wood stoves) 
with residents from other villages. They could also strengthen their interpersonal rela-
tions. In San Fernando, a woman reflects: ‘It is like the group gives strength, the union 
helps one to feel relieved’. They also felt more self-confident because they learned, en-
joyed and worked together for the well-being of their families and community. 
On the other hand, they could feel harmed by control-oriented project practices and lose 
their self-confidence. Power relations between participants and project staff are very 
important. If participants succeed to finish their commitments and reach the valued out-
puts, despite the adverse circumstances, they could feel proud. For instance, despite 
mistreatments, women in Santa María now feel more respected by men. A woman re-
counts: 
‘When the men arrived with the material [for the home sanitation system], they said, 
‘where are you going to make it?’ I told them ‘right here’. [They replied], ‘Are you going 
to make it?’ ‘I am’, I said, and I began to make it (laughs).’ 
Agency is the foundation of individual autonomy, but it is necessary to analyse whether 
the structural contexts support the exercise of autonomy. A person could feel capable 
but powerless to promote their own development. If this feeling persists and people see 
their efforts constantly frustrated, they could steadily lower their aspirations (cf., 
Cleaver, 2005). It seems that despite the long experience of leaders in Agua Fría, the 
poor reliability of the water system and the failure to register the NGO is causing disap-
pointment in non-leaders because their efforts did not succeed. Only half of the survey 
respondents in Agua Fría said that the community would expand their opportunities. 
Third, projects can influence the structural contexts in multiple ways, for instance, by 
supporting an ongoing positive change (in San Agustín), starting a community organisa-
tion from scratch (in San Fernando), unintentionally worsening local governance (in 
Agua Fría) or choosing non-representative local partners (in Santa María). An early 
engagement of project formulators in local communities could build the support of 
‘boundary partners’ (Earl et al., 2002, cited by Crawford et al., 2005) such as communal 
leaders or local politicians. In that way, the chances for cooperation and mutual learning 
during the project would increase.  
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6 Conclusions 
We have explored elements of the project logic of four aid projects to consider their 
possible effects on individual autonomy. We suggest that the explicit inclusion of a hu-
man-autonomy effectiveness criterion in design, implementation, monitoring and evalua-
tion of projects will help promote human development (Muñiz Castillo, 2009; Muñiz 
Castillo & Gasper, 2009). In addition, it supports the achievement and sustainability of 
intended project goals, when these goals are valued by project participants. 
We show that a crucial step to understand the (unintended) effects of project practices is 
to uncover the implicit assumptions that sustain these practices, either resulting from 
(externally defined) logical frameworks or from negotiated practices in particular con-
texts, which evolve during the project. Those assumptions concern values and needs, 
individual and group capacities, aspirations, local governance, and power structures. 
These assumptions are often wrong and put at risk the achievement of intended out-
comes. If, nevertheless, they influence the behaviours of project staff and local stake-
holders who aim to reach what is expected at all costs, pursuit of this constrained goal 
can harmfully affect the participants’ autonomy. 
Top-down project design or pseudo-participatory exercises will most likely pay no at-
tention to crucial life aspects relevant to local participants and will make wrong assump-
tions. Community leaders might formally accept project goals and activities but work 
backstage to build relations with powerful outsiders and be able to make changes later. 
This strategy will be more or less effective depending on the formal power structures 
and community dynamics. 
All four projects included self-construction activities, expected to favour local owner-
ship of the projects. However, their actual practices could externalise the motivation of 
project participants when excessive conditionality made people feel like working for 
someone else, when their opinions were disrespected or when they were poorly in-
formed about their entitlements. The effect on the participants’ autonomy depends on 
their personal factors and the perceived role of the community organisations in such 
contexts. 
The involvement of community organisations was different in each project case, but 
mostly served to support tangible project outputs (section 3.2). However, the San 
Agustín case illustrates how an aid project can go further and support an ongoing 
change process led by a community, engaging actors in structural contexts at different 
levels and working with a local social intermediary. The participatory formulation, the 
functioning of the working group and the elaboration of the municipal plan were possi-
ble thanks to the intrinsic motivation of local leaders and their developed organisational 
skills linked to their socio-historical experiences. In contrast, when project practices 
constrain the opportunities and perceived competence of individuals to help themselves, 
the ‘development’ or change promoted by those projects is not sustainable. 
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Photo 1: Panoramic view of San Fernando’s urban centre (February, 2005) 
 
 
 
Photo 2: Assembly at a small village school, Agua Fría (August, 2005) 
 
 
 
Photo 3: A new human settlement in San Agustín (September, 2005) 
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